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Abstract 
This article is about the importance of an institutional perspective of trust. The 
core argument is that the type, scope and organization of civil society play a crucial 
role for the high level of trust and social capital in the Scandinavian countries. We 
argue that both the legitimacy of public institutions and their ability to deliver over 
time depend on a vibrant organizational society in which the organizations have 
independent institutional significance in their own right. Similar to other key social 
institutions, their functions include shaping sets of values and reducing vulnerability 
and uncertainty. Furthermore, these organizations constitute an entirely necessary 
infrastructure for cooperation, which makes it possible for trust to be 
institutionalized, reinvested and converted into action, and which also demonstrates 
that cooperation is rational and yields results. The aftermath of the terror attacks in 
Norway in 2011demonstrated the existence of a strong civil society and its crucial role 
for community resilience. It contributed to curtailing widespread fear, mobilizing for 
collective manifestations of grief and restoring a sense of normalcy. However, the key 
role of civil society is not a permanent given. Developments within organized civil 
society may change their direct role as institutions and their indirect role as premise-
setters and critical-correctors, particular in relation to the public sector. This may 
weaken the function of these organizations as key carriers of social trust. 
Keywords: civil society, voluntary organizations, institutionalism, terrorism, welfare 
state. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this article, we argue for an institutional perspective of trust in which a 
strong civil society plays a core role. The basis of our argument is that the type 
of civil society that exists, along with its scope and organization, has played 
and continues to play a vital role for the high level of trust and social capital 
that is well documented in the Scandinavian countries. Our approach contains 
three vital elements.  First, we believe that both the legitimacy of public 
institutions and their ability to deliver over time completely depend on a 
vibrant organizational society. Second, the organizations have independent 
institutional significance in their own right. Similar to other key social 
institutions, their functions include shaping sets of values and reducing 
vulnerability and uncertainty. Third, they constitute an entirely necessary 
infrastructure for cooperation, which makes it possible for trust to be 
institutionalized, reinvested and converted into action, and which also 
demonstrates that cooperation is rational and yields results. 
We believe that this is not merely a productive approach to research on 
trust and social capital, but that it also helps explain some of what is unique to 
Scandinavia: the Scandinavian exceptionalism that is so apparent with regard 
to voluntarism, trust and social capital, and which is institutionally 
demonstrated though a unique regime of civil society and a distinctive model 
of the welfare state (Wollebæk & Selle 2008).The aftermath of the terror 
attacks in Norway in 2011 in our view demonstrated the existence of a strong 
civil society and its crucial role for community resilience (Norris et al. 2008) – 
it contributed to curtailing widespread fear, mobilizing for collective 
manifestations of grief and restoring a sense of normalcy. At the same time, 
we argue that the key role of civil society is not a permanent given. The 
developments we have seen within organized civil society over the past 
decades can change their direct role as institutions and their indirect role as 
premise-setters and critical-correctors, particularly in relation to the public 
sector. In turn, this may weaken its function as key carrier and 
institutionalization of social trust. 
 
2. Civil society and trust 
 
Our approach has developed throughout the last decade or so, first as a 
critique of the micro-oriented socialization perspective within research on 
trust and social capital in particular (Putnam 2000), but eventually also toward 
what we can call the state-centered and macro-oriented approach that links 
trust to the state’s output, with specific emphasis on the degree of welfare 
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universalism and well-functioning institutions that regulate conflict  (Rothstein 
& Stolle, 2003, 2008).  
Robert Putnam revitalized trust as a central concept in political science 
through his important work on social capital, in which trust is a key 
component. Putnam has defended a viewpoint that it is primarily through 
active, face-to-face participation in voluntary organizations and partly through 
other social networks in the local community, that one learns through 
experience that others are to be trusted. In a more recent book, he argues for 
the significance of having extensive social networks with the accompanying 
face-to-face contact that surrounds organized religion in the United States 
(Putnam & Campbell, 2011).  According to Putnam, trust then arises as a by-
product of social interaction in civil society.  We refer to this orientation as the 
socialization perspective below. 
This point of view has been challenged by more macro-oriented political 
scientists. Empirical studies have been referred to – including ours (Wollebæk 
& Selle, 2002b, 2007) – that point to the weak or nonexistent effects of active 
organizational participation on social capital. This was interpreted as proof 
that the role of voluntary organizations is greatly exaggerated in the literature 
on social capital (Rothstein & Stolle 2003, 2008). According to Rothstein and 
Stolle, political conditions should be given more emphasis, like the 
significance of essentially universal, just and well-functioning welfare systems, 
along with trust in institutions that regulate conflict.  People draw conclusions 
from personal experiences with the front line of the welfare state, along with 
the police and legal system. If a person experiences unfair treatment, 
manipulation and corruption by these actors, this affects attitudes towards 
other people’s inclination to cheat or exploit the system, and our own 
behavior adapts accordingly. To the extent that the institutions that regulate 
conflict (the police and the legal system) function in an impartial, efficient and 
just manner, we can feel secure that significant deviance will be sanctioned. It 
will thereby become easier to show trust in others. We refer to this position as 
the state-centered perspective below. 
However, we believe that the role organizations play in the level of trust 
in a society is incorrectly specified in the first depiction, and underemphasized 
in the second (Wollebæk and Selle 2007). The socialization function of the 
organization is exaggerated in Putnam’s framing, and the role of the 
organizations is rendered invisible through the strong emphasis on what and 
how public institutions deliver in Rothstein and Stolle’s output-oriented 
framework. Where the socialization perspective becomes too micro-oriented 
and fails in its attempt to aggregate from a micro-level to the level of society, 
the state-centered output perspective is too macro-oriented and fails to grasp 
the importance of the linkages between the different levels. In this way, it also 
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fails to grasp the conditions necessary for the welfare regime to survive over 
time. 
Our approach starts out from the organizational level (meso) and views 
the voluntary organizations primarily as institutions of society and structures 
for communication. However, what happens at the micro and macro levels is 
still very important – it is the relationships that exist across levels that are the 
main focus. Here, the organizations play a key role as intermediary structures. 
Being an intermediary is not mainly a theoretical construction in the Nordic 
countries as it is in much of the research on civil society and democracy 
otherwise, but rather a structural and empirical reality. Further, our 
perspective builds on a clear distinction between generating and maintaining 
or institutionalizing social capital.  Despite the fact that these are two 
completely different processes, this distinction is barely mentioned in the 
literature, possibly as a result of the heavy emphasis on individual participation 
as a prerequisite for developing trust. 
Below, we give a more detailed explanation of what we perceive as being 
problematic aspects, both from the socialization perspective, and the state-
centered perspective. The socialization perspective encounters both 
theoretical and empirical problems; it is based on a normative enthusiasm for 
active participation that ought to be questioned, and the mechanisms it 
postulates have hardly any empirical support.  The state-centered perspective 
is problematic because it primarily focuses on experiences with institutions 
within the public sector and attributes significant to these institutions. Too 
little attention is paid to other social institutions, especially within civil society. 
We do not learn much about how these public institutions are maintained, or 
how they change. We believe that this cannot be due to their own success 
alone, but also has something to do with expectations and pressure from other 
social actors. Finally, we summarize the basic structure of our alternative 
approach, which we consider to be a distinctive position in the literature on 
trust. 
3. The limitations of participation 
We are fundamentally skeptical to a basic assumption within large 
segments of the social capital theory, as well as in other key areas within 
modern, participant-oriented democracy theory: the idea that everything that 
is good comes from one’s own active participation.  
This “romanticization of participation” is something from which we have 
always kept a certain distance. The perspective is characterized both by 
paternalism, which we find normatively problematic, as well as a lack of 
empirical evidence. In our view, in a relative free society, as a matter of 
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principle one should be allowed to both withdraw and at the same time be a 
full member of society. The idea of volunteering as “the positive influence” 
that protected people against the harsh public sphere and the brutal labor 
market – which is strongly emphasized in the literature – is something we 
never bought into. According to our understanding, organizational life reflects 
society for better or for worse. 
However, at the same time, organizations can be an important driving 
force for change. The potency of this capability of change has varied in 
different social fields, during different periods and in different societies. Still, 
few people would deny the importance of the people’s movements during the 
last half of the 1800s for the gradual democratization of Norway, or the 
importance of female-dominated organizations on how significant health and 
social fields ended up being for the development of the welfare state, as well 
as the impact of new social movements on debates on gender equality or on 
environmental and climate policies. Well-functioning public institutions have 
been, and continue to be, dependent on an active civil society that identifies 
and gives space to new areas of politics.  
As a part of this more overarching thought, we came to focus more on 
the organizational society’s role with regard to democracy, rather than social 
integration. The socialization perspective was greatly toned down, and from 
the end of the 1990s, the role of democracy within organizations that are not 
themselves democratically constructed, was discussed (Selle & Strømsnes 
1997, 1998):  Gradually we also became more focused on the external role of 
democracy (democracy in society), than the internal one (the organization as a 
democratic structure and schooling in organizational democracy). 
A comprehensive study of Norwegian environmental organizations from 
the middle of the 1990s clarified to us the significance of the distinction 
between the internal and external role of democracy in organizations. 
Environmental organizations often had few active members, to the degree 
that it was questionable whether they were grounded in the membership 
model at all (Grendstad, Selle, Strømsnes, & Bortne, 2006). The new 
organizations that emerged during the second half of the 1980s were often not 
democratically constructed. The passive supporters (or checkbook supporters) 
received information, often in the form of a comprehensive membership 
newsletter, and supported the organizations financially, but that was generally 
the only contact they had with the organization as a meeting place. Thus, there 
was none of the sort of face-to-face socialization Putnam describes. 
In various works, we discussed not only the crucial role these passive 
supporters have for the existence of these organizations (for example, for 
their financial conditions), but also the idea that these organizations in spite of 
their passive rank and file, still constitute important institutions within 
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democracy (Selle & Strømsnes, 1998). At the same time, the idea that the 
passive members and checkbook supporters have great significance in the 
organizational society and within the democracy gradually takes form.  The 
generally high level of trust that we find among this group, which is not 
distinguishable from the activists, calls the initial conditions of the 
socialization perspective into question (Wollebæk &Selle 2002b). The 
questions that have been raised are as follows: Why is a person a member 
when s/he does not participate? Why is passive membership so common in 
Scandinavia in comparison with other places? Do passive members constitute 
their own type who distinguish themselves from the typical activists, but who 
still have a very important democratic role to play? 
At the same time, the environmental project clarified something else that 
was important. The passive members were often members of many other 
environmental organizations (some were members in just about all of them), 
as well as other types of organizations where they also socialized with like-
minded people, even if not in the context of an organization. The idea 
emerged that a passive membership could be an important resource, not just 
for the organizations, but also for the individual member, especially if we 
considered the extensive communication system one could be a part of 
through such a connection.  The passive members did not appear as 
marginalized. On the contrary, they were more similar to the active members 
than those who stood on the outside of the organizational society. Passive 
members even appeared to be more concerned about political questions, 
especially with regard to national and international questions, than those who 
were very active (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002b; Wollebæk & Strømsnes, 2008) 
Eventually, both our own and others’ empirical research helped reinforce 
our skepticism. A significant number of studies concluded that there was 
hardly any connection between the individual’s active participation in an 
organization and social trust (Claibourn & Martin, 2000; Dekker & van den 
Broek, 1998; Freitag, 2003; Hyggen, 2006; Mayer, 2003; Stolle, 2001; von 
Erlach, 2005; Wollebæk & Selle, 2002b, 2007; Wollebæk & Strømsnes, 2008). 
Recently, longitudinal panel studies have emerged that seem to once and for 
all refute any claims for a causal relationship between active organizational 
participation and trust (Bekkers 2011, Sturgis et al. 2012). Yet while repeated 
studies have demonstrated that the role of organizational life as a 
“socialization machine” is probably exaggerated, a robust relationship between 
trust and the breadth of organizational associations emerged – the number of 
different organizations a person is a member of – irrespective of the level of 
activity (Mutz 2002, Wollebæk og Selle 2002b). In other words, the number of 
connections to various organizations revealed itself to be more important for 
the level of trust than how active a person was. 
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This is an important characteristic of the organized civil societies in the 
Nordic countries, where, above everything else, participation is characterized 
by a high number of organizational memberships – as a passive member or an 
active participant (Wollebæk &Sivesind 2010).  Such intersecting 
organizational networks can lead to increased tolerance and understanding for 
other people’s arguments (Mutz 2002). If the tension is reduced between 
organizational members, it can perhaps also have a positive effect on those 
who stand on the outside. Overlapping and intersecting organizational 
networks generate knowledge about “the others” and cross-cutting pressure 
that can counteract escalating conflict between individuals and groups. 
This is not a new insight. The idea of overlapping cleavages and the value 
of belonging to “cross-cutting” networks occupies a crucial place within 
classic, pluralistically-oriented political science, in which Stein Rokkan (1967) 
also greatly emphasizes the significance this has had for the extent of social 
mobility in the Scandinavian countries in comparison with other societies. 
However, this comprehensive and relevant literature is seldom drawn into 
analyses of how trust and social capital at the present time is created, 
preserved or destroyed. 
In summary, the empirical support for the socialization perspective is 
quite weak. It does not seem to be intensive participation that generates trust. 
Membership, active as well as passive, in political organizations and the 
breadth of membership appear to be more important, and the distinction 
between active and passive members is much smaller than between passive 
members and non-members. 
4. Voluntary organizations as institutions 
Yet if the individual effects of one’s own activity within an organization 
are weak, the effect of everyone else’s organizational participation, manifested 
in a powerful organizational society, is strong (Wollebæk og Sivesind 2010).  
There is namely a tremendously close connection between trust and the 
organizational society’s strength at an aggregated level. In a study of 141 
European regions, there was an almost perfect correlation (.87) between the 
average number of organizational memberships in the region and the degree 
of generalized social trust (Wollebæk & Selle, 2007). There is little to indicate 
that this is a spurious effect of other factors, such as level of wealth, trust in 
conflict-regulating institutions, ethnic homogeneity or social equality. The 
connection between the organizational society’s strength and the level of trust 
in a society is hardly weakened, even if all of these factors are taken into 
consideration.  
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The Nordic regions scored by far the highest both with regard to 
organizational participation and social trust. This tells us that there is a unique 
constellation in the Nordic countries that must be explained, and that the 
individual-based explanations about socialization are insufficient to explain 
this variation. We believe that the state-centered perspective does have 
something to offer in explaining these variations. However, it places a rather 
heavy burden of explanation on a relatively new political model . Several other 
important, shared historical characteristics of the societies  with high levels 
trust in the Nordic region date many centuries back, like a high degree of 
homogeneity, a strong culture of community volunteering and collaboration, 
low levels of illiteracy, which is an important consequence of the Reformation 
and, in connection with this, extensive voluntary organizing. Still, the most 
important limitation of the state-centered perspective is that it is assumed that 
all of the important social institutions reside in the public sector.  In our 
opinion, this is an unrealistic and quite unfortunate limitation. 
On the contrary, we believe that the differences between societies that 
contain organized civil societies of varying strength support the idea that 
voluntary organizations are vital institutions when it comes to explaining the 
extent of trust and social capital in a more general way. Our basic argument is 
that voluntary organizations preserve trust by virtue of their institutional role, 
rather than generating it through socialization (or being irrelevant). This 
implies that they also affect people who are not linked to the organizational 
society at all. It is more important for the degree of trust that the individual 
belong to a community with strong organizations than for the individual 
him/herself to be greatly involved in organizations. 
In our empirical study, this was supported by the fact that those who 
stood entirely on the outside of organizational life in the Nordic countries had 
a much higher level of trust than those who were very active in most of 
Europe otherwise. How could this be the case? We attempted to answer this 
with the help of a third question: “Do you think that voluntary organizations 
are an effective way to influence decisions in society” (Wollebæk and Selle 
2007)? It appeared that positive answers were sufficiently linked to social trust; 
those who either held many memberships (active or passive) or had great faith 
in the organization’s ability to get things accomplished, whether they were 
members or not, were the most trusting. Those who stood entirely on the 
outside and in addition viewed organizations as less useful expressed the least 
amount of trust toward others. Thus, having faith in what the organizations 
could accomplish was a closer correlate of to trust than personal experiences 
from face-to-face meetings with other active members.  
In our view, these findings underline the need for shifting the perspective 
away from regarding organizational society as comprised by agents of 
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socialization towards regarding them as an infrastructure - as institutions that 
affect the opportunity and space for collective action (both in shape and 
content). 
This role can be compared with other types of infrastructure in society. 
The benefit of having a road is not limited to those driving at any given time; 
the benefit of telephone lines is not limited to those who currently engage in 
telephone conversation. In the same way, voluntary organizations have a 
latent beneficial value, even for those who are not members. In a strong 
organizational society, non-members are also aware of the possibility of 
getting involved in organizational activities to promote the issues they are 
concerned about, or to ask for help or support from the organization 
according to need.  
The fact that this infrastructure has been especially important in 
Scandinavia is not only due to the sector’s high and cross-cutting membership 
figures. Another important condition is its unique form of organization. Most 
organizations have had local and (usually) regional branches tied together by a 
national superstructure, with strong institutional ties between the levels 
(Wollebæk & Selle, 2002a). The principal rule in the voluntary sector in many 
other countries, is that what is local is local and what is national is national 
(Torpe & Ferrer-Fons, 2007, Skocpol 2003). This structure has in Norway 
also coincided with and been strengthened by the way the municipalities and 
counties have been integrated into the national system of governing. This has 
to do with having a unique mix of strong centralization with a simultaneous 
emphasis on local and regional autonomy (Tranvik and Selle 2005). 
This hierarchical organizational structure reflects the fact that our 
organizational society has been political and externally oriented from the 
beginning. The popular movements that dominated organizational life in the 
Scandinavian countries emerged parallel to the democratization of the political 
system. Just about every organization selected organizational models that 
imitated those of the parties and administrative structure, with local, regional 
and national sections.  The local section was integrated into the central one, 
and vice versa (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002a). 
An organizational structure in which the local and national are linked 
together, creates a greater potential space for collective, politically-oriented 
action, than a bipartite local and national organizational life, which to a much 
greater degree limits the potential for influence to one level.  Still, the 
organizational societies of several Nordic countries have started to move in 
this direction in recent decades (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002a; Wollebæk, 
Siisiäinen, & Ibsen, 2010).  Local community organizing, and the subsequent 
ability to affect and resolve local and generally everyday challenges, is of 
course not unimportant, but it is still an insufficient measure of real citizen 
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power. One must also be able to have an effect (political input) where the 
higher political resolutions are passed. Since democratic governance in 
practice is multi-level in character, this presupposes that large segments of the 
organizational society also must be vertically or hierarchically constructed in 
order to preserve its important role as an actual intermediate structure 
between the individual and society in general. 
This is why the organizational connections reaching out of the local 
community are so important. Despite this, dominant theories in the field put 
very little emphasis on the structure of an organization, or the way in which to 
organize. Such ideas are to a large extent absent in Putnam’s socialization 
perspective about the development of trust and social capital, in which the 
most important thing seems to be that the organizations are as “horizontal” as 
possible, and free of power, dominance and conflict.  An important exception 
is Skocpol’s works on the American organizational society’s development and 
change, which shows that hierarchical organizations that linked the local and 
national level together also have been very important in the American 
democracy (Skocpol, Ganz, & Munson, 2000, Skocpol 2003). However, these 
structures are disintegrating, as they are in Norway, though this is happening 
to a much greater degree within American organizations of this nature. 
We argue that neither dense local communities with a great deal of face-
to-face contact, nor faith in the idea that a friendly state provides services in 
an efficient way (to the extent this is possible in a society without powerful 
voluntary organizations), is sufficient for preserving a trusting society over 
time. It is vital that there is also an institutional level with both comprehensive 
knowledge of and critical distance to government institutions, in order to 
supervise, and, if necessary, be a counterforce to the state and its structures. 
Such structures are by no means constant and can be strengthened or 
weakened over time, and they certainly cannot be found in every society, at 
least not to the same extent. In other words, taking the organizations’ role as 
institutions in society seriously means that they are understood as being 
something that goes beyond and is far more important than just being arenas 
of leisure where people meet face-to-face.  
This has entirely different implications for which voluntary organizations 
are emphasized than in the socialization perspective. While there has been a 
great deal of concern that members are becoming increasingly passive, 
because it is face-to-face social contact that is assumed to create trust, our 
perspective points toward visibility in society as being the most crucial factor, 
rather than the level of activity. The organizations must be publicly visible. 
Organizations that withdraw,  do their own thing and do not really try to 
change or influence their surroundings at all will not have the same effect on 
people’s view of cooperation as being something rational, meaningful and 
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accessible in the same way that the more external oriented and visible 
organizations have.  
Further, the same mechanisms described by the state-centered 
perspective on public institutions might also be relevant to voluntary 
organizations. Experiences with how such organizations function, whether 
mediated or personally experienced, can influence our perspective on other 
people’s willingness and ability to cooperate. Visible, externally-oriented 
organizations that achieve results are ongoing proof of rationality, normality, 
and the benefit of cooperating with others. Thus, this is about something 
much greater than the individual person’s encounter with what public 
institutions have to offer, where the instrumental and more expressive factors 
are interwoven in complex ways.  Organizations that come across as 
ineffective, including committing fraud when it comes to financial support, or 
lying and manipulating have the opposite effect, making us more skeptical 
when it comes to making financial contributions and giving numerical support 
to an organization at the next crossroad. 
6. Civil society change and the future of trust 
The organized civil society is constantly changing. We have previously 
documented a shift in the primary focus of the organizational society: from 
society-based to member-based objectives, from a conflict orientation toward 
a consensus orientation, and from connections between the local and national 
level to a bifurcation of the organizational society (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002a). 
Increasingly, organizational life is primarily an arena in which Norwegians 
carry out their leisure activities. Entirely new data from the local 
organizational level indicate that this development has unabatingly continued 
in more or less the same direction during the recent decade, with the 
exception of a reorientation towards the local community rather than their 
own members (Christensen, Strømsnes og Wollebæk 2011). At the same time, 
new data from the individual level demonstrate a clear sign of lethargy in 
Norwegians’ willingness to allocate their time toward active organizational 
participation (Wollebæk & Sivesind, 2010). 
How should one interpret this development from a perspective of trust? 
From the state-centered perspective of trust formation, it is of no 
consequence.  As long as both the front line of the welfare state and the 
conflict-regulating institutions function in a fair and predictable way, people 
will trust each other to a greater degree here than in other places. The degree 
to which this will continue to be the case is certainly an entirely different 
question. The point here is that the direction civil society is developing has 
almost no importance within this way of thinking. The question of whether 
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the welfare state and public institutions can continue to be impartial, efficient 
and just in the context of a depoliticized and privatized organized civil society 
is not really thematized.  It is the output aspect of politics (what gets done in 
what way), not input (the influence of direction and content), that receives 
focus.  
There is a dual challenge here. The institutional focus is too limited, while 
at the same time there has been a lack of interest in who actually influences 
the conditions and ensures that they are present for the same public 
institutions to be able to reasonably deliver as promised over time. This has to 
do with both how such a system could develop in the first place, and what the 
conditions are for them to be maintained.  
As shown above, Putnam has the diametrically opposite perspective: 
political institutions play secondary roles in relation to individual face-to-face 
socialization. Putnam establishes an individual-centered (and consensus-
oriented) perspective on the role of the organizations, in which conflict - and 
everything vertical - often gets described as a threat to trust and integration.  
Here, voluntary organizations are primarily important as arenas for horizontal 
(that is, power neutral) interaction that in turn create trust (Putnam, 2000).  
Thus, in this perspective, the developments of recent decades in Norwegian 
organizational life are partly positive, at least until the arrows began to point 
downwards in terms of the amount of volunteering and active participation 
(Wollebæk & Sivesind, 2010). The growing types of organizations represent 
more of the apolitical and horizontal social interactions, which Putnam and 
others view as being the most productive sources of trust . 
In other words, we believe that both of these influential approaches miss 
the mark- where one trivializes something that is important, the other 
exaggerates the wrong aspects. Two premises make up our point of departure: 
the fact that social institutions influence (and are influenced by) the value 
patterns of the population and that voluntary organizations are important 
social institutions.  Yet if this is to be properly understood, it involves an 
entirely different way of viewing voluntary organizations within the jigsaw 
puzzle of trust than that which has dominated large sections of the literature 
about social capital. The amount of activity that takes place within the 
framework of the organizations of civil society is not the only factor that 
should be taken seriously, but also what they are doing, and particularly how 
they are structured, because this greatly affects what they can do and how they 
want to do it. Their role, the changes within it and the consequences of such 
changes, must be comprehended more holistically, in which all of the 
important dimensions are included. Here, according to our perspective, the 
relationships and interactions that the organizations of civil society have with 
the other main sectors in the society (state and market) are absolutely crucial. 
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The development from conflict to consensus and from hierarchical 
structure to bifurcated organizational communities in Norway and the rest of 
Scandinavia makes the organizations less visible in the public sphere. The 
organizations cannot in the same way constitute a real democratic 
infrastructure or counterbalance to dominance from the state and market. 
This may contract organizational life and weaken both its breadth and depth. 
It would be of no big surprise if such a development can affect its trust-
preserving function over time. 
The end of innocence? Norway in a post-terrorism environment 
The processes of change we have described so fare are incremental and 
slow. At other times, societies may change abruptly due to external shocks. 
One such shock occurred on July 22nd 2011, when 77 people were killed in 
the first large scale act of terrorism in peace time in Norway.  
The events and their aftermath present an opportunity for reflection on 
the resilience of civil society and trust structures in Norwegian society. As a 
peaceful, relatively homogeneous country at the outskirts of Europe, one may 
have feared that the shock of exposure to violent terrorism could have had 
particularly detrimental effects; it could have disrupted trust structures and 
heralded a new era of fear and distrust. This did not happen. In the weeks 
following the attacks, both interpersonal and institutional trust increased from 
already high levels (Wollebæk et al. 2012a). Moreover, widespread fear did not 
set in. People showed comparatively little concern for the possibility of new 
attacks, largely due to their strong belief in the government’s ability to protect 
and their high generalized trust, the seemingly unwavering belief of 
Norwegians in the good intentions of others (Wollebæk et al. 2013). 
In the following months, the muted critique of the actions of the police 
and other core institutions gradually became more vocal, culminating with the 
damning report of the July 22nd Commission, published in August 2012. In 
the aftermath of the report, the population professed much less trust in the 
government’s ability to protect against terror. Still, general questions 
concerning trust in institutions and other people showed that, with the 
exception of weakened trust in the police, which not only received the most 
damning critique from the commission, but had exonerated themselves in 
their own internal evaluations, levels had not dropped further, but normalized 
to pre-22nd July levels.   
The main narrative of the year following July 22nd is one of community 
resilience (Norris et al. 2008). Community resilience describes a society’s 
ability to return to normalcy after an external shock. There is no doubt that 
the strength of civil society proved a crucial resource in this process; in 
mobilizing a sense of togetherness and organizing national manifestations of 
grief. As the main victim of the organization was a voluntary association – the 
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youth wing of the Labor Party – the events seem to have led to something of 
an awakening among youths previously unconcerned with organized political 
activity. 
However, the main test for civil society and the maintenance trust 
structures is yet to come. The 22nd July Commission Report identifies 
systemic failures in the public sector in how it has dealt with terrorism. 
Rectifying these mistakes is not something that can be achieved by political 
decisions alone. Preparedness against external threats such as terror is a so-
called wicked problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Wicked problems are, in 
contrast to “tame problems”, unstructured, dynamic and complex. They are 
characterized by a multitude of stakeholders with varying understandings of 
the problem, absence of simple solutions, and great uncertainty with regard to 
cause and consequences of the problem. Quick fixes, such as increased 
surveillance, are unlikely to yield much more than a false sense of security.  
The situation in Norway post July 22nd speaks to the limitations of 
public sector institutions in maintaining trust. The extent to which a sense of 
security, upon which an open, trusting society is fully dependent, can be fully 
restored, will largely hinge on the strength of the structures we have discussed 
and described above, and the successful interplay between civil society and the 




In this chapter, we have made the case for a third position between a 
micro-oriented socialization perspective and a macro-oriented state-centered 
perspective. We believe the socialization perspective is correct in regarding 
voluntary organizations as important with respect to trust, but that the 
mechanisms in the theory are incorrectly specified. We also agree with the 
state-centered perspective that institutions play an entirely central role with 
regard to social trust. However, we criticize its failure to adequately identify 
the significance of the organizations of civil society. First of all, we are 
convinced that the institutions of civil society influence our norms and our 
view about the sensibility and accessibility of cooperating with other people.  
Second, we believe that it is insufficient to focus exclusively on the output 
aspect of politics, without systematically including the input aspect, not to 
mention the interaction between the input and output aspects of politics. 
What is it that creates trust, provides the social system with legitimacy and 
gives politics their content? Our view is that a strong civil society, organized 
and socially directed, has vital significance here. 
The main elements in our approach can be summarized in five points: 
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- Institutions are significant for trust – the reasons for trust cannot be 
localized exclusively at the micro level. 
- The organized civil society constitutes important social institutions – 
the welfare state’s front line, police and legal system are not the only 
institutions that shape the basic set of values. 
- A strongly organized civil society directly affects the level of trust in a 
society, both among those who actively participate and those who stand on 
the outside. They constitute the space of possibility and an infrastructure for 
collective and democracy-related action, and they demonstrate that 
cooperation is rational and may lead to results. 
- A powerfully organized civil society has an indirect effect on the level 
of trust. Without a powerful civil society (input), we believe public institutions 
will have great problems with both legitimacy and efficiency over time 
(output). 
- The function of civil society depends on both time and context.  The 
third and fourth points presuppose visible organizations that provide actual 
input into democracy, administration, and politics. 
 
In other words, according to our perspective, it is vital that the 
organizational society has sufficient visibility, breadth and constitutes actual 
intermediate structures to be able to fulfil the functions outlined above. 
The organizational society can institutionalize and preserve trust. Yet it is 
not the case that all institutions, regardless of what they do or how they are 
structured, have the same effect in institutionalizing trust. We have stressed a 
unique Norwegian and Scandinavian structure that links the local and national 
together, an orientation toward society rather than just the individuals who are 
linked to the organizations, and an ambition to influence or change society. In 
recent decades, the organizational society has started to go in the opposite 
direction. This development can diminish the organizational society’s ability to 
institutionalize and preserve trust over time, and thereby change our society 
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